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The plaintiff/appellant, Jonathon Jones, pursuant to Rule
24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the
following Brief.
JURISDICTION
This appeal was originally filed with the Utah Supreme Court
but, on December 24, 1992, was poured-over by that Court to the
Utah Court of Appeals.

This Court has jurisdiction to decide this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-2 (h). This is an appeal
from a final Order of Dismissal of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Homer Wilkinson presiding.

The Order of Dismissal entered by the

trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant and
dismissed the plaintiff's claims as against the defendant with
prejudice.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
The following issues are presented to this court for review:
1. Did the court err in ruling that the Plaintiff's claim is
barred by the Doctrine of Assumption of the Risk or should the
issue be decided by the jury?
2. Did the court err in ruling that the plaintiff's claim is
barred because the defendant did not intend to injure the plaintiff
or is such a question of fact to be decided by the jury?
3. Did the court err in ruling that the plaintiff's claim is
barred because the defendant did not violate any safety rule?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-37, (1953), as amended;

1

Utah Code Annotated §78-27-38, (1953), as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action for reckless, intentional and negligent
conduct against the defendant, which conduct in the course of a
softball game, caused injury to the plaintiff.
B. Course of Proceedings.
After some discovery, and a Motion for Summary Judgment by the
defendant, the lower court granted the defendant's Motion
Summary Judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's claim.

for

No oral

argument was heard by the trial court on the defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
C. Statement of Facts.
1. Appellant was the first batter in an amateur L.D.S. church
softball game.
2. Appellant hit the first ball

softly

into the

infield

towards the pitchers mound.
3. Appellee, who was playing second base on the opposing team,
relaxed when he saw the ball hit towards the pitcher but, when the
ball rolled between the pitchers legs, ran towards the ball, caught
it barehanded with his right hand and threw it sidearm to first
base.
4. The ball was thrown wide of the first baseman and struck
the appellant on the left side of his face when the appellant was
past first base.
5. It is disputed as to how far beyond the first base bag the
2

appellant was when he was struck by the ball.
6*

As a result of the blow to his face by the ball, the

appellant suffered severe fractures of his facial bones and the
orbit of his left eyef resulting in permanent blindness in his left
eye.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant's reckless or negligent conduct caused injury to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff's assumption of the risk, if any, in
playing

Softball, does not preclude his being awarded

damages

against the defendant, but merely is a factor for the trier of fact
to take into consideration when apportioning negligence.
Similarly, the fact that the defendant may not have acted
intentionally

in injuring the plaintiff or may not violated a

safety rule while playing the game likewise does not preclude the
plaintiff from proving that the defendant was negligent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF "ASSUMPTION
OF RISK"
Utah Code Annotated §§78-27-37 and -38 (1953) , as amended, are
the

two

statutes

standards.

which

codify

Utah's

comparative

negligence

In U.C.A. §78-27-37 (2), "fault" is defined as meaning

"any actionable breach of legal duty, act or omission proximately
causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person
seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk . • ."
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(Emphasis added).
person

U.C.A. §78-27-38 states that "The fault of a

seeking recovery

person."

shall not alone bar recovery by

that

(Emphasis added).

In his memorandum to the trial court, the defendant/appellee
claimed that the doctrine of "assumption of the risk" acts as a
complete bar to the plaintiff/appellant.

However, in Jacobsen

Construction v. Structo-Lite Engineering. 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980),
the Utah Supreme Court stated that:
Under the circumstances in this case, the term
"assumption of the risk" meant the voluntary, yet
unreasonable, encounter of a known, appreciated
risk. The complete bar to recovery which such
conduct once constituted in a negligence action
has been abolished by the Utah comparative negligence statute to avoid the harshness visited
upon plaintiffs as a result of the all-or-nothing
nature of the former rule of law.
Id. at 309 (Emphasis added)
At the trial court, the appellee cited the Utah case of Moore
v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981), as his
authority for the proposition that "assumption of the risk" is a
complete bar to a plaintiffs recovery. However, in Moore, the Utah
Supreme Court stated that:
The complete bar to recovery in an action for
negligence, which assumption of the risk has
been historically, has been lifted by the Utah
comparative negligence statute to avoid the
harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result
of the all-or-nothing nature of the former
rule of law.
Id. at 878 (Emphasis added)
The appellee, and the trial court, misread and misapplied
Moore.

Instead of a complete bar to a plaintiff's

4

recovery,

assumption of the risk is merely one factor that the trier of fact
takes into account when determining comparative negligence on a
special verdict form.
Utah's Comparative Negligence statute (U.C.A. §78-27-38) makes
clear that any assumption of the risk by the plaintiff does not
completely bar that person's recovery.

In any event, the fault of

one of the parties is an issue for the trier of fact to determine.
The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment to the
appellee on the grounds that assumption of the risk is a complete
bar to a plaintiff's claim.

It simply is not a complete bar, but

just one factor for the trier of fact to take into account during
its deliberations on comparative fault.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED
EVEN THOUGH THE APPELLEE MAY NOT
HAVE INTENDED AN INJURY TO THE
APPELLANT
In his memorandum to the trial court, the appellee claimed
that,

because

he

did

not

intend

appellants claim should be barred.
in his

assertion

inflicted

in

the

that

to

harm

the

of

an

the

While the appellee is correct

"some courts have held

course

appellant,

athletic

than

an

competition

injury
can

be

maintained if a participant intentionally injures an opponent", the
courts have also held that the plaintiff may maintain an action if
the defendants conduct

is deliberate, willful

or done with

reckless disregard for the safety of other players.

a

At the trial

court, the defendant relied upon the Illinois Court of Appeals case
of Naboznv v. Barnhill, 334 N.E. 2d 258
5

(111. App. 1975), in

support of his position.
In Naboznv, the plaintiff was injured when kicked in the head
by an opposing player during a soccer game.

At the end of the

plaintiff's case, the court granted the defendant's motion for a
directed verdict.

The plaintiff appealed, contending that the

trial court had erred in granting the directed verdict and that the
plaintiff's

participation

in

the

game

did

not

establishment of a prima facie case of negligence.

prohibit

the

In overturning

the trial court, the Illinois Court of Appeals stated that:
It is our opinion that a player is liable for
injury in a tort action if his conduct is such
that it is either deliberate, willful or with a
reckless disregard to the safety of the other
player so as to cause injury to that player, the
same being a question of fact to be decided by a
juryId. at 261. (Emphasis added)
Accordingly,

whether

or

not

the

defendant

was

acting

deliberately, willfully or with a reckless disregard for the safety
of the plaintiff is a question for the trier of fact to decide.
The trial court erred in granting appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment based on this theory.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BECAUSE
THE APPELLEE MAY NOT HAVE VIOLATED A
SAFETY RULE
Appellee claims that, because he may not have violated a
safety rule, the appellants claim is barred.

However, the case

cited by the appellee to the trial court, Nabozny, supra, does not
stand for that proposition.
6

Nabozny says that the violation of a safety rule may be the
basis of a claim, not that the non-violation of a safety rule bars
such a claim.

That is, it does not stand for the proposition that

a violation of a safety rule by a plaintiff is required for a
plaintiff to be able to maintain a claim in a sports case.

The

appellee and the trial court misread and misapplied Naboznv on the
issue of whether or not a violation of a safety rule is required in
order for a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action in a sports
related accident.
In any

event, there

is no evidence

in the record

which

supports the appellees position that he did not violate a safety
rule.
The

trial

court

erred

in granting

appellee's

Motion

for

Summary Judgment based on the fact that the appellee had not
violated some safety rule.
In the absence of case law to the contrary, the appellant
should be able to maintain a cause of action even if there has been
no violation of a safety rule by the appellee.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's Summary Judgment
in favor of the appellee and remand the case for reinstatement of
the appellee's cause of action.
DATED this \Jn

day of March, 1993.
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY
Attorneys for Appellant

By:
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-37, (1953), as amended
Definitions
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who
is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person
seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty,
act or omission proximately causing or contributing to
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery,
including, but not limited to, negligence in all its
degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of the risk,
strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty
of
a
product,
products
liability,
and
misuse,
modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking
damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf
of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal
representative.

Utah Code Annotated §78-27-38, (1953), as amended
Comparative Negligence
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any
defendant or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his
own.
However, no defendant is liable to any person
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the
proportion of fault attributable to that defendant.
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